The Growing Challenge of Drone Threats in the Baltic States
Recent drone incursions along NATO's eastern flank have highlighted the urgent need for the Baltic states to enhance their air defences. However, experts warn that a lack of equipment and trained personnel across Europe could hinder efforts to close critical gaps in drone detection and response.
Tomas Jermalavičius, head of studies at Estonia's International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), emphasized that "industrial capacity is the main constraining factor." As countries invest heavily in air and missile defence systems, they are competing for the same radar systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and counter-drone technologies from a limited number of providers. This competition has led to procurement backlogs, rising costs, and extended delivery times, according to Jermalavičius.
Key Components of Effective Drone Response
To effectively respond to a drone threat, military forces require tracking sensors, effectors to neutralize the drone, and an overarching architecture that integrates data from cameras, radar, and acoustic sensors. Federico Borsari, a defence analyst at the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), explained that any gap in these elements can complicate the counter-drone process.
For the Baltic countries, the first challenge is detecting the drones themselves. Current radar systems struggle to distinguish drones from birds or other small objects due to their low altitude and slow speed. In some cases, fighter jets are deployed to gain a better aerial view, but this approach is costly and not always practical.
Prioritizing Short-Range Radar Systems
Jermalavičius stressed the importance of investing in short and very-short range radios to improve drone tracking. Short-range radars offer more accurate detection and easier identification of threats, as longer-range systems often lose track of drones flying into airspace. Integrating these radars into the existing Baltic Air Police system could help detect aircraft, drones, and missiles more effectively.
However, there are limitations to how many drones can be deployed simultaneously, requiring strict prioritization. While short-range missiles are a useful tool, they are not a perfect solution for every drone incursion. Over-investing in one area could lead to underinvestment in other critical technologies, such as cost-effective interceptors.
The Reality of Limited Coverage
"No country can provide 100% coverage at all times, in all places, of all potential targets against all types of threats," Jermalavičius said. This means that some drones will inevitably slip through regardless of the measures taken.
Countries like the Baltics and Poland, located along NATO's eastern flank, understand the need for investment but recognize that building robust air defences is a long-term process. Borsari noted that while short-term radar investments are important, the Baltic states should also consider acquiring new technologies, such as high-energy lasers, which are both affordable and effective against drones.
Competition for Equipment and Expertise
Despite the urgency, there are significant barriers to implementing short-range radars across the Baltic defence line. Jermalavičius pointed out that it can take up to 24 months to produce and deliver a single radar system, making the availability of suppliers a major determining factor.
Europe faces chronic air defence gaps, with all countries competing for the same equipment from a limited number of vendors. This creates a tight race for resources, further complicating the situation.
In addition to radar systems, other essential components for drone detection include acoustic sensors, electro-optical, and infrared sensors—many of which are lacking across Europe. Jermalavičius and Borsari also highlighted a shortage of expertise and qualified personnel, particularly in small countries with competitive labour markets.
Integrated Surveillance and Coordination
The Baltic states have a well-integrated air surveillance system called Boltnet, which shares threat detection between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as with NATO's integrated air and missile defence systems. If an Estonian radar detects a threat, the information is immediately shared with operators in the other two countries and NATO.
However, Jermalavičius emphasized the need for Boltnet to integrate additional ground-based actors, such as the Baltic Air Policing and the Territorial Defence Forces, to improve the overall response to drone threats.
Conclusion
As the threat from drones continues to evolve, the Baltic states must navigate complex challenges in securing their air space. From equipment shortages to a lack of skilled personnel, the path to a fully effective drone defence system is fraught with obstacles. Yet, with strategic investments and improved coordination, the region can work toward a more resilient and responsive air defence network.
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