Poland needs to strive for cutting-edge weaponry, such as nuclear arms and contemporary non-traditional weapons," said Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk during an address to Parliament last month. "This is a significant competition—a contest for safety rather than conflict.
As the Trump administration indicated it was largely stepping away from safeguarding Europe, Tusk’s remarks appeared to hint at a possible shift towards increased nuclear weapon dissemination across the continent—a direction contrary to Europe’s long-standing policies.
Despite lingering doubts about the United States’ continued dedication to ensuring European nuclear security, China is increasing its nuclear weapons capabilities. Meanwhile, Russia—which possesses the largest cache of nuclear warheads—frequently threatens their use to caution NATO and the EU from direct military involvement in Ukraine.
The broader scenario brings up two challenging queries. Firstly, how can Europe sustain a pan-continental nuclear deterrence strategy? Secondly, is there a chance that additional nations might become part of the nuclear powers' circle?
Even though several countries in Europe possess certain components necessary for acquiring an independent nuclear weapon capability, specialists believe that the likelihood of additional European nations pursuing nuclear status remains low.
Starting from scratch
As stated by Fabian Rene Hoffmann, a research fellow with the Oslo Nuclear Project, should any European NATO member be eager to create their own nuclear arsenal instead of merely storing existing ones, they would essentially begin from scratch.
"The primary challenge for European nations is that they either lack the civilian nuclear facilities needed to initiate a nuclear weapons program, or if such infrastructure exists, it is designed with significant 'anti-proliferation' measures," he explained to Euronews.
For instance, both Finland and Sweden possess solely light-water reactors, making them unsuitable for generating weapons-grade plutonium. Moreover, these nations do not have chemical reprocessing facilities required to isolate desired isotopes from undesired ones during the production of fissile materials.
Even if these countries wished to initiate a nuclear program, they would be unable to do so with their current facilities, particularly not within the near future. This applies to every European nation without nuclear weapons that currently has a civil nuclear initiative.
Hoffman recognized one potential exemption: Germany.
Although it doesn’t install major civilian nuclear facilities these days, it possesses a substantial amount of highly enriched uranium for research reasons,” he stated. “In theory, with considerable effort, this supply might be converted into weapon-grade fissionable material.
“However, even with this amount, it would suffice for approximately 5 to 15 nuclear warheads, which means it wouldn’t be sufficient for maintaining what we refer to as a ‘strong’ nuclear deterrence.”
Opening the umbrella
Both European nations with nuclear arsenals, the United Kingdom and France, face significant choices regarding their nuclear strategies moving forward.
Currently, the United Kingdom's submarine-based nuclear deterrent faces an unclear path forward. Its aging fleet of submarines will soon require replacement, and even more critically, the missiles they carry are manufactured and stored at a U.S. facility. This makes Britain's security heavily dependent on another country's involvement.
In contrast, France's deterrent force is bigger and less dependent on NATO, extending beyond just submarine-based capabilities. This allows for potential deployment "forward" across other parts of Europe—but as Hoffman pointed out, implementing such a concept isn’t straightforward.
"He informed Euronews that infrastructure development, particularly bunkers, would need to take place in the host nations," he stated. "Additionally, positioning French nuclear arms in Germany wouldn't significantly alter anything. They ought to be deployed instead towards front-line states" — referring to countries like Poland that face Russia directly.
Following Poland’s desire for US nuclear weapons to be stationed on its territory, he made these remarks.
Out of the shadows
Following the conclusion of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Poland no longer hosted the Soviet nuclear arms previously located within its borders. Similar to many European nations, it has subsequently endorsed several global accords aimed at curbing the proliferation of nuclear weaponry, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
If Poland or another European country were to begin developing their own nuclear weapons, they would be discarding a principle that has been upheld in the Western world for the past thirty years.
The extensively established worldwide system aimed at stopping the spread of nuclear arms has primarily concentrated on restricting North Korea’s weaponry development, averting high-enriched uranium production in Iran, and halting unchecked global movements of uranium, plutonium, along with the parts required for sufficient enrichment to produce a functional nuclear weapon.
The possibility of a European state independently developing weapons was never negotiated — however, this doesn’t imply that an ambitious proliferator could achieve this without detection.
Hoffman stated that none of the European non-nuclear-weapon states would probably manage to secretively proliferate. "Similar to every part of the globe, Europe’s nuclear facilities and related materials are closely monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. This makes it highly probable that any unauthorized movements would be detected," he explained.
In spite of this, international organizations and watchdogs responsible for preventing the spread of weapons face the challenge of adapting to emerging technologies that could potentially facilitate illegal proliferation.
opting for an affordable nuclear option
Of particular concern is additive manufacturing, also known as 3D printing. According to the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, this technology might facilitate "the creation of unstable routes towards acquiring nuclear capabilities and weaponry." This could allow aspiring proliferators to avoid typical inspections by producing difficult-to-obtain parts domestically through 3D printers.
Up until now, global efforts aimed at preventing proliferation have primarily concentrated on making it extremely difficult for nations acting unilaterally to create weapons clandestinely. However, with advancements like 3D printing and AI transforming technology landscapes, strategies used to curb illegal dissemination might require adaptation in this era of emerging innovations.
A significant historical instance stands out from this period. During the middle of the 20th century, apartheid-era South Africa commenced testing nuclear weapons and eventually developed six warheads capable of being mounted onto intercontinental ballistic missiles in theory.
Importantly, the nation enhanced its own weapons-grade uranium using a technique known as the Helixon vortex separation process. This method, though energy-demanding and costly, remains a concern for certain specialists who fear it might still be employed to refine a minimal amount of fissionable uranium nowadays.
So far, South Africa stands as the sole nation in history to have built its own nuclear arms and subsequently dismantled them, terminating its deterrence and ballistic missile initiatives as apartheid unraveled and the Cold War concluded.
However, the tale of its affordable expansion initiative underscores that despite rigorous global oversight of critical dual-use parts and radioactive substances, a nation sufficiently resolute in pursuing a nuclear defense could potentially achieve this objective domestically.
It remains to be seen whether any contemporary European countries would consider taking such an extreme measure, which could place them alongside nations like North Korea. However, the actions of both the United States and Russia in the coming period might ultimately decide this outcome.
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