North Korea's Constitution Widens Divide with Seoul

North Korea's Revised Constitution: A Shift in Relations with South Korea

North Korea has made significant changes to its constitution, removing all references to the possibility of reunification with South Korea and redefining the latter as a "hostile state." This move marks a major shift in the country’s official stance on inter-Korean relations and is seen as a formalization of the growing divide between the two Koreas.

The new constitution, which was shared by South Korea's Ministry of Unification on May 6, introduces several key changes. These include:

• The abandonment of the goal of unifying the Korean peninsula, with South Korea no longer considered part of a shared national community
• A new territorial clause that defines North Korea as a country bordered by China and Russia to the north and the Republic of Korea to the south
• Kim Jong Un being granted exclusive authority over the use of nuclear weapons
• The removal of clauses that previously highlighted the achievements of his predecessors, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il

This change contrasts sharply with South Korea’s constitution, which claims the entire Korean Peninsula and its islands as its own territory. The previous constitution included Article 9, which stated that North Korea would “strengthen the people’s government in the northern half” and “strive to achieve national reunification.” Additionally, references to the “Three Principles of National Reunification” — independence, peaceful reunification, and national unity — have been eliminated.

Kim Jong Un had already begun shifting his rhetoric earlier in 2023, referring to Seoul as the “main enemy.” He later ordered the demolition of a major reunification monument in Pyongyang, signaling a clear break from past policies.

At the Supreme People’s Assembly in January 2024, Kim called for a constitutional amendment that defined South Korea as the North’s “primary foe and invariable principal enemy,” stating that North Korean territory was separate from that of the South.

Redefining South Korea as a Foreign Enemy

Experts suggest that these changes reflect a broader shift in how North Korea views its southern neighbor. Hong Min, a senior researcher at the state-run Korea Institute for National Unification, described the changes as an extension of the doctrine of a “struggle against the enemy” and the concept of two hostile states that Pyongyang has pursued since the collapse of the 2019 US-North Korea summit in Hanoi, Vietnam.

According to Hong, North Korea is now moving toward redefining South Korea not as a partner for reunification or as part of the same ethnic community, but as a separate, hostile foreign power. This shift is seen as a strategic move to reinforce the regime’s internal control and justify potential provocations.

Cha Du Hyeon, vice president of South Korea’s Asan Institute for Policy Studies, noted that the “two hostile states” doctrine is not just a diplomatic expression but a structural choice linked to the Kim regime’s internal governance, power preservation, and strategy toward South Korea. By portraying South Korea as an external enemy, Pyongyang aims to contain internal dissent, reinforce the logic of regime security when it feels vulnerable, and use hostility toward Seoul as a pretext for provocation when conditions are favorable.

However, the term “hostile relations” does not appear explicitly in the amended constitution. Instead, Kim stated at a Supreme People’s Assembly in March that North Korea officially recognizes South Korea as a hostile state, while the removal of the concept of reunification also signals a shift to a more antagonistic relationship with Seoul.

Ambiguity Over Maritime Borders

Hong also pointed out that the new territorial clause could be interpreted as North Korea’s de facto acceptance of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) as a border between the two countries. However, he warned that this should not be read as a clear recognition of the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the disputed maritime boundary in the Yellow Sea.

This ambiguity, according to Hong, could give Pyongyang room to act more aggressively in future maritime disputes. Han Ki Bum, a former deputy director of South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), said that although the amended constitution does not explicitly define maritime boundaries, there are concerns about possible provocations near the NLL, especially after North Korea’s additional deployment of destroyers to the Yellow Sea earlier in May.

Consolidation of Kim Jong Un’s Power

The amendment also reflects Kim Jong Un’s consolidation of personal power. By enshrining his exclusive right to use nuclear weapons in the constitution, the changes codify the theory of two hostile states and the consolidation of Kim’s one-man dictatorship, according to Han.

Cha noted that the amendment emphasizes that Kim is the only person authorized to deploy conventional and nuclear forces in the event of a crisis. This gives Pyongyang a stronger foundation for future negotiations with South Korea and other countries.

Regarding the removal of references to the achievements of Kim Jong Un’s grandfather, Kim Il Sung, and father, Kim Jong Il, Hong explained that the previous constitution had been heavily centered on the achievements and deified rule of the two leaders, often referred to as the “Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il Constitution.”

In the new amendment, the focus has shifted toward a national narrative centered on the state, territory, sovereignty, and nuclear capabilities. While this may appear to be an attempt by North Korea to present itself as a more conventional state, Hong argued that it is in reality a move to further strengthen Kim’s personal power.